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Wednesday, July 14, 2010

Jul 14 CVE-2009-4324 PDF President Obama's Detrimental Deadlines

CVE-2009-4324 Use-after-free vulnerability in the Doc.media.newPlayer method in Multimedia.api in Adobe Reader and Acrobat 9.x before 9.3, and 8.x before 8.2 on Windows and Mac OS X, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted PDF file using ZLib compressed streams, as exploited in the wild in December 2009.
 
 Download 51d54fce1d57a7228a4ed8d193f9f2bf and 0f5d42aa99b17eabddc19a46013b517b  as a password protected archive (please contact me if you need the password)

From: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Sent: Wednesday, July 14, 2010 9:42 AM
To: XXXXXXXX
Subject: Fw: AEI : President Obama's Detrimental Deadlines

----- Forwarded Message ----
From: accounts-noreply@aei.org accounts-noreply@aei.org
To: XXXXXXXXXXXX
Sent: Tue,July 13, 2010 10:35:55 AM
Subject: AEI.org : President Obama's Detrimental Deadlines

President Obama's Detrimental Deadlines
By Marc A. Thiessen | Washington Post
Tuesday, June 29, 2010
Rather than setting artificial deadlines, President Obama must start projecting resolve to win the war in Afghanistan, and he must tell Americans the stakes, the consequences of failure, and why he will not accept defeat.   [Read more]

The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
www.aei.org
Phone: 202.862.5800


Headers
Received: (qmail 6387 invoked from network); 14 Jul 2010 13:26:37 -0000
Received: from static-76-9-100-66.ngn.onecommunications.net (HELO XXXXXX) (76.9.100.66)
[...]
From: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
To: XXXXXXXXXXX
Subject: =?iso-8859-1?B?Rnc6IEFFSSA6IFByZXNpZGVudCBPYmFtYSdzIERldHJpbWVudGFsIERlYWRsaW5lcw==?=
Date: Wed, 14 Jul 2010 09:41:52 -0400
X-Priority: 3
X-Mailer: Extreme Mail Express
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="----=NextMime00A_000_90245093D"
Hostname:    static-76-9-100-66.ngn.onecommunications.net
ISP:    One Communications Corporation
Organization:    GAWRYL AND MACALLISTER ATTORNEYS AT LAW
Type:    Corporate
Assignment:    Static IP
Country:    United States us flag
State/Region:    New Hampshire
City:    Keene

File President_Obama_s_Detrimental_Dea received on 2010.07.28 03:41:23 (UTC)
http://www.virustotal.com/analisis/6b5a5f8b09ef4a6571f5431008c3ad80441205c9cba2c565ad8a21ea0421d7e4-1280288483
Result: 18/42 (42.86%)
AhnLab-V3    2010.07.28.00    2010.07.27    Win-Trojan/Exploit-PDF
AntiVir    8.2.4.26    2010.07.27    EXP/Pidief.244965
Authentium    5.2.0.5    2010.07.28    PDF/Pidief.BO
Avast    4.8.1351.0    2010.07.28    JS:Pdfka-gen
Avast5    5.0.332.0    2010.07.28    JS:Pdfka-gen
BitDefender    7.2    2010.07.28    Exploit.PDF-JS.Gen
CAT-QuickHeal    11.00    2010.07.27    Exploit.PDF.FlateDecode
DrWeb    5.0.2.03300    2010.07.28    Exploit.PDF.687
Emsisoft    5.0.0.34    2010.07.28    Exploit.JS.Pdfka!IK
eSafe    7.0.17.0    2010.07.27    Exploit.PDF.f
F-Prot    4.6.1.107    2010.07.28    PDF/Pidief.BO
F-Secure    9.0.15370.0    2010.07.28    Exploit.PDF-JS.Gen
GData    21    2010.07.28    Exploit.PDF-JS.Gen
Ikarus    T3.1.1.84.0    2010.07.28    Exploit.JS.Pdfka
McAfee-GW-Edition    2010.1    2010.07.27    Heuristic.BehavesLike.JS.BufferOverflow.A
Norman    6.05.11    2010.07.27    JS/Shellcode.HQ
nProtect    2010-07-28.01    2010.07.28    Exploit.PDF-JS.Gen
Sophos    4.55.0    2010.07.28    Troj/PDFJs-GQ
Additional information
File size: 106155 bytes
MD5...: 51d54fce1d57a7228a4ed8d193f9f2bf


 President_Obama_s_Detrimental_Dea received on 2010.07.15 11:59:20 (UTC)
Result: 19/42
http://www.virustotal.com/analisis/34cb88a51729a7d54d6e575ae14e184b25ee581ee15bc60775251909d63bd477-1279195160

Antivirus     Version     Last Update     Result
a-squared     5.0.0.31     2010.07.15     Exploit.JS.Pdfka!IK
AhnLab-V3     2010.07.15.01     2010.07.15     Win-Trojan/Exploit-PDF
AntiVir     8.2.4.10     2010.07.15     EXP/Pidief.244965
Authentium     5.2.0.5     2010.07.15     PDF/Pidief.BO
Avast     4.8.1351.0     2010.07.14     JS:Pdfka-gen
Avast5     5.0.332.0     2010.07.15     JS:Pdfka-gen
BitDefender     7.2     2010.07.15     Exploit.PDF-JS.Gen
CAT-QuickHeal     11.00     2010.07.15     Exploit.PDF.FlateDecode
DrWeb     5.0.2.03300     2010.07.15     Exploit.PDF.687
eSafe     7.0.17.0     2010.07.15     Exploit.PDF.f
F-Prot     4.6.1.107     2010.07.15     PDF/Pidief.BO
F-Secure     9.0.15370.0     2010.07.15     Exploit.PDF-JS.Gen
GData     21     2010.07.15     Exploit.PDF-JS.Gen
Ikarus     T3.1.1.84.0     2010.07.15     Exploit.JS.Pdfka
McAfee     5.400.0.1158     2010.07.15     Exploit-PDF.q.gen!stream
McAfee-GW-Edition     2010.1     2010.07.15     Heuristic.BehavesLike.JS.BufferOverflow.A
Norman     6.05.11     2010.07.14     JS/Shellcode.HQ
nProtect     2010-07-15.02     2010.07.15     Exploit.PDF-JS.Gen
Sophos     4.55.0     2010.07.15     Troj/PDFJs-GQ
Additional information
File size: 155575 bytes
MD5   : 0f5d42aa99b17eabddc19a46013b517b

Vicheck.ca
PDF Exploit call to media.newPlayer CVE-2009-4324
https://www.vicheck.ca/md5query.php?hash=51d54fce1d57a7228a4ed8d193f9f2bf

PDF Exploit call to media.newPlayer CVE-2009-4324
https://www.vicheck.ca/md5query.php?hash=0f5d42aa99b17eabddc19a46013b517b


ZeuS Version scheme by the trojan author

List of all official existing Zeus versions and the scheme description made by the author in his mother tongue.  The source is Damagelab.org but I can't find the original post, sorry - it was from this winter 2010. Many other versions like 1.3.1.1 and other random numbers are fakes - hex'd , slightly modified older versions. There is an English translation below, it is not perfect but *not* Google machine. Email me if you have any questions.

Read more about ZeuS here - Zeus Trojan Research Links

Q: Что значат цифры в версии ZeuS?
A: a.b.c.d
   a - полное изменение в устройстве бота.
   b - крупные изменения, которые вызывают полную или частичную несовместимость с предыдущими
       версиями бота.
   c - исправления ошибок, доработки, добавление возможностей.
   d - номер чистки от AV для текущей версии a.b.c.

Q: What do the numbers in the version of ZeuS mean?
A: a.b.c.d
   a - a complete change in the bot design
   b - the major changes that cause complete or partial incompatibility with the previous
       versions of the bot.
   c - correction of bugs, errors, refining, additional features.
   
d - number of cleaning for protection against AV for the current version abc


SCROLL DOWN TO SEE ENGLISH TRANSLATION
====================== = 5. История версий. = ======================
Условные метки:
[*] - изменение. [-] - исправление. [+] - добавление.

[Версия 1.2.0.0, 20.12.2008]
Общее:
[*] Более не будет документации в chm-файле, все будет писаться в этот файл.
[+] Теперь бот способен получать команды не только при отправки статуса, но и при отправки файлов/логов.
[+] Локальные данные, запросы к серверу, и файл конфигурации шифруются RC4 с ключом на ваш выбор.
[*] Полностью обновлен протокол бот--сервер. Возможно, понизится нагрузка на сервер.
Бот:
[-] Устранена ошибка, блокирующая бота на лимитированных ученых записях Windows.
[*] Написан новый PE-криптор, теперь PE-файл получается очень аккуратным и максимально имитирует результат работы MS Linker 9.0.
[*] Обновлен процесс сборки бота в билдере.
[*] Оптимизировано сжатие файла конфигурации.
[*] Новый формат бинарного файла конфигурации.
[*] Переписан процесс сборки бинарного файла конфигурации.
[*] Socks и LC теперь работают на одном порту.
Панель управления:
[*] Статус панели управления переведен в BETA.
[*] Изменены все таблицы MySQL.
[*] Начет постепенный перевод Панели Управления на UTF-8 (возможны временные проблемы с отображением символов).
[*] Обновлена геобаза.


[Версия 1.2.1.0, 30.12.2008]
Бот:
[*] BOFA Answers теперь отсылается как BLT_GRABBED_HTTP (было BLT_HTTPS_REQUEST).
[-] Мелкая ошибка при отправке отчетов.
[-] Размер отчета не мог превышать ~550 символов.
[-] Ошибка существующая с начала существования бота: низкий таймаут для отсылки POST-запросов, в результате чего блокировалась отсылка длинных (более ~1 Мб) отчетов на медленных соединениях (не стабильных), как теоретическое последствие - бот вообще переставал слать отчеты.
Общее:
[+] В случаи записи отчета типа BLT_HTTP_REQUEST и BLT_HTTPS_REQUEST в поле SBCID_PATH_SOURCE (в таблице будет path_source) добавляется путь URL.
Панель управления:
[*] Обновлен redir.php.


[Версия 1.2.2.0, 11.03.2009]
Бот:
[-] Устранена ошибка в HTTP-инжектах существующая на протяжении ВСЕХ версий бота. При использовании в программе асинхронного режима wininet.dll, был упущен момент синхронизации потоков создаваемых wininet.dll, в результате чего, при некоторых условиях происходило исключение.
[+] При срабатывании HTTP-инжекта, теперь также изменяются файлы в локальном кэше. Отсутствие этой доработки, позволяло не всегда срабатывать HTTP-инжектам.
[+] Уменьшен размер PE-файла.


[Версия 1.2.3.0, 28.03.2009]
Бот:
[-] Мелкие ошибки в крипторе, спасибо доблестным говноаналитикам из Avira.
Общее:
[*] Изменен протокол раздачи команд ботам.
Панель управления:
[*] Полностью переписана панель управления.
[*] Дизайн переписан на XHTML 1.0 Strict (под IE не работает).
[*] Бот теперь опять способен получать команды только при отправке отчета об онлайн-статусе (слишком высокая нагрузка).
[*] Обновлена геобаза.

[Версия 1.2.4.0, 02.04.2009]
Бот:
[+] При работе с HTTP, заголовок User-Agent теперь читается от Internet Explorer, а не является константой как раньше. Теоретически из-за постоянного User-Agent'а, запросы могли блокироваться провайдерами, или попадать под подозрение. Панель управления:
[-] Исправлена ошибка отображения отчетов, содержащих символы 0-31 и 127-159.


[Версия 1.2.5.0, 27.05.2009]
Бот:
[+] Незначительная оптимизация кода. Панель управления:
[-] Устранена уязвимость в gate.php, позволяющая записывать файлы в родительские директории.
[+] Добавлены запрещенные расширения в массив $bad_exts.
[+] В модуле botnet_bots, при изменение фильтра сохраняется текущая сортировка.

[Версия 1.2.6.0, 04.06.2009]
Бот:
[+] Перехват библиотеки nspr4.dll.

[Версия 1.2.7.0, 22.06.2009]
Общее:
[+] В отчеты добавляется имя пользователя, которому принадлежит процесс. Бот:
[+] Отключение фишинг-фильтра в IE7, IE8.

Версия 1.2.8.0, 05.10.2009]
Бот:
[+] За счет включения опции TCP_NODELAY, увеличена скорость работы Socks-сервера, и прочих встроенных протоколов. Это будет особенно заметно для протоколов, обменивающихся мелкими TCP-пакетами.
[+] При соединении с сервером через Wininet, не добавлялся HTTP-заголовок "Connection: close", когда это было необходимо. Из-за особенностей Wininet, это могло создать лишнею нагрузку на сервер (вероятно). Панель управления:
[*] Обновлена геобаза.


[Версия 1.2.9.0, 10.10.2009]
Бот:
[+] Добавлен граббер паролей для следующих FTP-клиентов: FlashFXP, Total Commander, WS_FTP FileZilla, FAR Manager, WinSCP, FTP Commander, Core FTP, SmartFTP.
[Версия 1.2.10.0, 17.10.2009] Панель управления:
[+] Полная интеграция "Jabber notifier".


Версия 1.3.0.0, 22.11.2009]
Бот:
[*] Перехват WinAPI методом сплайсинга.
[+] Полноценная работа в Windows Vista/7.
[*] Временно отключено скрытие файлов бота.
[*] Убран TAN-граббер.
[-] Исправлена ошибка дублирования отчетов в nspr4.dll.
[*] Сграбленные сертификаты теперь пишутся с именем grabbed_dd_mm_yyyy.pfx, и паролем в UTF-8. [*] Команда getcerts, получается сертификаты только из MY-хранилища, а не из всех. Т.к. получение сертификатов из всех хранилищ не имеет смысла.
[*] Изменено поведение граббера сертификатов.
[*] Переписан FTP/POP3 снифер, улучшено обнаружение логинов, сделана поддержка IPv6-адресов.
[*] Переписан перехват ввода клавиатуры, исправлен метод работы с интернациональными символами. [-] Исправлена ошибка в HTTP-фейках, которая могла привести к deadlock.
[*] Изменен способ генерации BotID.

[Версия 1.3.1.0, 29.11.2009]
Бот:
[-] Устранена серьезная ошибка, которая могла возникнуть при работе с файлом конфигурации.

[Версия 1.3.2.0, 11.01.2010]
Бот:
[-] Устранена серьезная ошибка, которая могла привести к deadlock в любом процессе (актуально только для билдов с поддержкой nspr4.dll).

[Версия 1.4.*]
[*] Полная несовместимость с предыдущими версиями.
[*] Поскольку ядро бота нацелено на Windows Vista+, в боте никогда не будут использоваться сплойты повышения привелегий и т.д. Бот работает в переделах одного пользователя. Тем неменее элементарные попытки заразить прочих пользователей Windows совершаются (обычно эффективно в случаях отключения UAC или запуск с из-под LocalSystem).
[+] Возможна работа с "Roaming User Accounts".
[*] Произвольные имена файлов, мютексов.
[*] Пайпы более не используются.
[*] Полностю переписано ядро бота, от процесса установки в систему до отсука в админку.
[+] При инсталяции, перекриптовывает свое тело, таким оброзом сохраняется уникальная копия exe-файла на каждом компьютере.
[+] Привязка бота к компьютеру, путем модификации/удаления некоторых данные в exe-файле. [+] Полноценная работа с x32 приложениями в Windows x64.
[+] Удаление исходного файла бота, после исполнения.
[+] Полноценная работа в "Terminal Services".
[+] При запуске из под пользователя LocalSystem, происходит попытка заражения всех пользовталей системы.
[*] Убрана опция StaticConfig.blacklist_languages.
[+] Имя ботнета ограничено 20 сиволами, и может содержать любые интернациональные символы.
[+] Файл Конфигурации читается как UTF8 ------------------------------ НЕ СДЕЛАНО ЕЩЕ. нет поддержки в buildcfg.cpp
[*] Убрана опция StaticConfig.url_compip.
[+] Нельзя обновить новую версию на старую.
[+] При обновлении бота происходит полное обновление немедленно, не дожидаясь перезагрузки.
[*] В данный момент из-за некторых соображений скрытие файлов бота не будет производиться вообще.
[*] Убран граббер Protected Storage, покольку начинася с IE7 он более не испольузуется им.
[*] С связи с не надежностью старой системы подсчета Инсталлов, бот имеет метку Инсталла при добавлении в базу.


Q: Каким оброзом генерируется Bot ID?
A: Bot ID состоит из двух частей: %name%_%number%, где name - имя компьютера (результат от GetComputerName), а number - некое число, генерируемое на основе некотрых уникальных данных ОС.

===========
= 5. Мифы =
===========
M: ZeuS использует DLL для своей работы.
A: Ложь. Существует только один исполняемый PE файл (exe). Dll, sys и т.д. не когда не было и  врятли когда-либо будет. Этот миф пошел в результате того, что в некоторых версия бота для хранения настроек, используются файлы с такими расширениями.


M: ZeuS использует COM (БХО) для перехвата Internet Explorer.
A: Ложь. Всегда для этого использовался перехват WinAPI из wininet.dll.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Machine translation - it is quite bad, I am planning to make a better one later.



Q: How Bot ID is generated ? 
A: Bot ID consists of two parts:% name% _% number%, where the name - the name of the computer (the result of GetComputerName), and the number - a certain number generated on the basis of unique data of the OS.
===========
= 5. Myths =
===========
M: ZeuS uses a DLL to their work. A: False. There is only one executable PE file (exe). Dll, sys, etc. not when there was no vryatli ever will. This myth came from the fact that in some version of the bot to store the settings used files with extensions.


M: ZeuS uses COM (BHO) to intercept Internet Explorer.
A: False. Always used
WinAPI from wininet.dll. for this interception

 ===================== 5. Version History (dates are in DD/MM/YY format). = ======================
Tags: [*] - change.
[-] - A correction. [+] - Add.

[Version 1.2.0.0, 20.12.2008]
Overall:
[*] There will be no more documentation in the chm-file, everything will be written to this file.
[+] Now the bot is able to receive commands not only when sending its status, but also when sending files / logs.
[+] Local data, server requests, and the configuration file are RC4 encrypted with the key of your choice.
[*] Completely updated bot <-> server protocol. Perhaps it will diminish the server load.
Bot:
[-] Fixed a bug that blocks the bot on limited Windows accounts.
[*] Written a new PE-cryptor, now PE-file is very neat and simulates the working result of MS Linker 9.0.
[*] Updated build process of the bot.
[*] Optimized compression of the configuration file.
[*] Introduced a new format of the binary configuration file.
[*] The build process of the binary configuration file is re-written.
[*] Socks and LC are now working on the same port.
Control Panel:
[*] Control panel status is now beta
[*] Changed all tables in MySQL.
[*] Started a gradual transfer of the Control Panel to UTF-8 (there may be temporary problems with some displaying characters).
[*] Updated geobase.

[Version 1.2.1.0, 30.12.2008]
Bot:
[*] BOFA Answers are now being sent as BLT_GRABBED_HTTP (was BLT_HTTPS_REQUEST).
[-] Small error when sending reports.
[-] The size of the report could not exceed about 550 characters.
[-] Error in existence since the bot introduction: a low timeout for sending POST-requests resulting in blocked long (more than ~ 1 Mb) reports on slow connections (unstable conections) and, as the theoretical implication, the bot would stop sending reports altogether.
Overall:
[+] When entering reports like BLT_HTTP_REQUEST and BLT_HTTPS_REQUEST into the field SBCID_PATH_SOURCE (would be path_source in the table) URL is now added.
Control Panel:
[*] Updated redir.php.



[Version 1.2.2.0, 11.03.2009]
Bot:
[-] Fixed a bug in HTTP-injections for all versions of the bot. When using asynchronous mode wininet.dll, it would miss the moment of the thread synchronization, which under certain conditions could cause an an exception. (ok, this is iffy and may need a better translation)
[+] when HTTP-injection occurs, the files in the local cache change too. Without this feature the HTTP-injections was not always triggered.
[+] Reduce the size of PE-file
[Version 1.2.3.0, 28.03.2009] 
Bot:
[-] Minor errors in the cryptor, thanks to the shit analysts from Avira.
Overall
[*] Changed the protocol of bot control commands.
Control Panel:
[*] Completely re-written Control Panel.
[*] Design rewritten to XHTML 1.0 Strict (does not work in IE).
[*] Bot again receives commands only when sending online status reports (utilization too high).
[*] Updated geobase.

Version 1.2.4.0, 02.04.2009]
Bot:
[+] When you work with HTTP, User-Agent string now shows as Internet Explorer and is not a constant value as before. Theoretically, never changing User-Agent queries could be blocked by providers or cause suspicions in the past.'
Control Panel:
[-] Fixed a bug in the display of reports containing characters 0-31 and 127-159
[Version 1.2.5.0,  27.05.2009]
Bot:
[+] Minor code optimization.
Control Panel:
[-] Fixed a vulnerability in gate.php allowing adding files to parent directories.
[+] Added new forbidden file extensions in the array $bad_exts.
[+] Changing filter in the botnet_bots module does not prevent from keeping the current sorting


[Version 1.2.6.0, 04.06.2009]
Bot:
[+] interception of nspr4.dll library.


[Version 1.2.7.0, 22.06.2009]
Overall:
[+] Added the name of the user- process owner into the reports
Bot:
[+] Ability to disable the phishing filter in IE7, IE8.


[Version 1.2.8.0, 05.10.2009]
Bot:
[+] By including option TCP_NODELAY, increased speed of the Socks-server, and other built-in protocols. This is particularly noticeable for the protocols, exchanging small TCP-packets.
[+] When connecting to the server via Wininet, HTTP-header "Connection: close" was not added when needed. This could possibly create an unnecessary load on the server.
Control Panel:
[*] Updated geobase.

Version 1.2.9.0, 10.10.2009]

Bot:
[+] Added grabber passwords for the following FTP-Client: FlashFXP, Total Commander, WS_FTP FileZilla, FAR Manager, WinSCP, FTP Commander, Core FTP, SmartFTP.

[Version 1.2.10.0, 17.10.2009]

The control panel:
[+] Full integration of "Jabber notifier". 
Version 1.3.0.0, 22.11.2009]
Bot:
[*] Intercept of WinAPI by means of splicing
[+] Fully functional in Windows Vista /windows 7.
[*] Temporarily disabled hiding of bot files. 
[*] Removed TAN-grabber. 
[-] Fixed duplicate records in nspr4.dll.
[*] Intercepted certificates are now entered as grabbed_dd_mm_yyyy.pfx, and password in UTF-8. 
[*] Command "getcerts" allows to get certificates only from MY-store, not from all locations because obtaining certificates from all the stores does not make sense. 
[*] Changed behavior of the certificates grabbers.
[*] Rewrote FTP/POP3 sniffer, improved detection of logins, introduced support for IPv6-addresses.
[*] Rewrote keyboard input interception feature, fixed methods of working with international symbols.
[-] Fixed bug in HTTP-fakes, which could lead to deadlock. 
[*] Changed the way of generating BotID.

 [Version 1.3.1.0, 29.11.2009]
Bot:
[-] Fixed a bug that could occur with the configuration file.

Version 1.3.2.0, 11.01.2010]
Bot:
[-] Fixed a serious bug, which could lead to a deadlock in any process (relevant only for builders with nspr4.dll support).

[Version 1.4 .*]  

[*] Full incompatibility with all the previous versions.
[*] Since the core of the bot is targeted to Windows Vista+, the bot will never use exploits for increasing privileges, etc. The bot works within one user account, however it will attempt to infect other Windows users (usually effective if you disable UAC or start it as LocalSystem).
[+] Ability to work with "Roaming User Accounts".
[*] Random file names, mutexes
[*] Pipe no longer used.
[*] The core of the bot has been completely changed. Everything - from the installation to the callback process.  
[+] As it installs itself, it re-encrypt itself so every computer has a unique copy of the exe file
[+] Binding bot to a computer by modifying / deleting some data in the exe file.
[+] Fully functional work with x32 applications in Windows x64.
[+] Delete the original file after the execution.
[+] Fully functionalin the "Terminal Services".
[+] When running as LocalSystem, it tries to infect all windows users
[*] Removed StaticConfig.blacklist_languages option.
[+] Name of the botnet is limited to 20 of characters, and may contain any international characters
[+] Configuration File is read as UTF8 ------------------------------ NOT DONE YET. no support in buildcfg.cpp
[*] Removed staticConfig.url_compip option.
[+] Can not be used to upgrade an older version
[+] the bot update happens instantly, not need to wait for a reboot.  
[*] At the moment, after condidering some aspects, decided not to hide the bot files
[*] Removed the Protected Storage grabber because IE7+ is not using it
[*] Since the old system had reliability issues with the way installs were counted, the bot will now have an install marker when added to the database.

Saturday, July 10, 2010

Update. Design contest: Top Ten targeted attack emails of 2009-2010. (Now Top Twenty)

Thanks to F-Secure mention of some of the targeted attack emails from our collection, there was an increased interest to the content and appearance of the messages. We usually pay more attention to  malware and forget about the message part, which is supposed to look impressive and lure recipients into opening malicious attachments. Today we present the Top Ten particularly well crafted messages of 2009-2010. They blend in with the rest of the mail filling our mailboxes and most are designed to look like another newsletter or publication. Some of the messages below were posted here earlier in 2010 or 2009. Some are spoofed while others are from free email accounts. PDF attachments are most common but MS Office documents get sent often too - especially during the days of unpatched vulnerabilities.

Update July 10, 2010 - Here are 10 more messages to add to the list of winners

This recent message from Russia reminded me about this targeted emails design contest we had in March 2010  and I decided to add more candidates. Shall we choose one winner in the end of the year?
I would say there is a subtle evolution in the design and sophistication of the attacks - comparing to the Top Ten winners posted in March 2010(scroll down to see)

Virustotal links show the malicious payload as it would be detected at the time of the receipt

 1. Jun 20 CVE-2010-1297 PDF Adobe 0-Day Meeting agenda from alexis.mo88@gmail.com

Virustotal 5/41  Zero Day

https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEihjtfHgJ0GEkN4_c9uANche2jVXQTdbd0rasoEESDVLyyCRtbCe8G3t4_OwKOGnGEHl0VUmFqvtgZCdMPlOlqCOk82yTu7fyXvvvdWn-OATxCzyAUeLV7r21vQOcvvX_mKPpZiKj9PlRc/s1600/msg.jpg

2. Apr 10 CVE-2010-0188 PDF Research Paper on Nuclear Posture Review 2010 and the upcoming Nuclear Security Summit

Virustotal 5/39


3 May 5 CVE-2010-0188 PDF 2010-05-06 Asian Pacific Security stuff from samuelberger19@yahoo.com

Virustotal 6/41

https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjkDill_-UjkWCYTFCaKLfYcVojLQ5V0O0JkMKuYgygr7czvVEorKow_MVN0SLA7rTGgF-UW7LNHLUAgsTmuQjKQc-G_i6Dpy26Us_i59DObOI1nCEsMMVQeL2fDW0hnLGiLmtn65id5JI/s1600/msg2+-+Copy.jpg
4. May 9 CVE-2010-0188 PDF Concept Paper.pdf from global.faruk@gmail.com

Virustotal 6/41 
 The forwarded conversation (it might be real or fake) together with a malicious attachment are quite convincing.


https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh0C8ifcmcNOFHhgaBP8mpUSSqf6QgZk9MovQYxDdtkfIx_vDrI0tkw42bzKJTJWuwA2m7EszX7_Yxfqkw-Jvjwu7x3GmAYSHhw8TeWCVnW4TCLAJw8078690KxYqoZwBk93dWmcUnyG84/s1600/msg.jpg

5. Mar 30 CVE-2009-4324 PDF China and Foreign Military Modernization from americansina@gmail.com

Virustotal 8/42

https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi-M9AZKUjBbpW2OZigBe3vbAcv4LaCXH6g1cw9y8aKhvLTIYzl4RGntSlWb1jfHJps3ip0mKJllxQPY_V4g6z3_ZpPgW1Ez5GOo3vOEe9Fm3ydtg7B7kSM4NVQDN7GdLLg5uZpaNQjE6w/s1600/msgch.JPG




Virustotal 14/41

https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhskCbHO-IBW2BeUAtaFUS2GS8Pcf1-KkRf1eAhTXi3qVIM9VTC4cz7p5stX0N6T9qdFCdERGmKtiqczSHHnjZ5EnS2eIchIVYOYUaKg8oi439C67QCCFUH77kox4JwNatN5aKQbtU1OVg/s1600/msg.jpg


7. Mar 24 CVE-2010-0188 PDF rumours in N Korea2010march from coljoint@aol.com 

Virustotal 4/42

https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgju713aKIsYcYA0tOyykWxGGAUz9Sx3aJZRxWnKQQO0e_Ob2Nj5RFk2EsakIYJJruhknITy1CPIBtGFHSqp3XoFf0OlWzWcltFP9c-FwpWqFCtWCWmsP5MluMGp7M6x-mApiDF6G5MTX0/s1600/msg.JPG


8. Mar 23 CVE-2009-4324 PDF Talking Points on Chinese Currency from eaisecs@nus.edu.sg

Virustotal 7/42

https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjwzE9QgWobaWVdoekJ5Iz5e4zbpiQreIpMAlv3KFJhZ-uvRLxj9IWwXRbxHCHUPlHLyd1a7ZKFRIk_h0VNb3N9-tvDrhY3YFZp89wB6aYlMxpYzgaHhyphenhyphenEbewIGnG_t19XdW2bYmpganjE/s1600/msg.JPG

9. Mar 14 CVE-2010-0188 PDF 2010 Trade Policy Agenda from irc@state.gov

Virustotal 14/42

[tradepolic.jpg]

10.  Mar 18 CVE-2009-4324 PDF Report on 2010 NPC Mar 18, 2010 8:53 AM
Virustotal 10/42 

[msg1.jpg]


ORIGINAL TOP TEN LIST (March 2010)

Virustotal links show the malicious payload as it would be detected these days. Most of them had much lower antivirus detection rate at the time of the receipt  - compare it to the AV detection rate of one of the recent messages (CVE-2010-0188).


Click on the pictures to enlarge
1 US-Taiwan Exchange Program Enhancement
Virustotal scan


2 2009 DoD ATC Procedures
Virustotal scan



3 Wolf Letter to Secretary Clinton Regarding China Human Right
Virustotal scan
 
4 Asking for an interview from NBC Journalist
Virustotal scan 



Thursday, July 8, 2010

Jul 8 CVE-2009-0556 China and the Cheonan Incident vargas43@hotmail.com


 Download  a362abe459c574b1984640316219c818 Presentations.pps as a password protected archive (contact me if you need the password)



From: Jorge Vargas [mailto:jorge.vargas43@hotmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 08, 2010 3:02 AM
To: XXXXXXXXXXX
Subject: China and the Cheonan Incident

China and the Cheonan Incident 
Author : David Kang Published
The Chinese are facing widespread criticism for their behavior following the Cheonan incident
______________________________________
Hotmail: Free, trusted and rich email service. Get it now.

 File Presentations.pps received on 2010.07.10 17:11:12 (UTC)
http://www.virustotal.com/analisis/e22805d4f845c42d801e6b2b87782716a01c2db0553e2b4da7eda355ba28cdcf-1278781872
Result: 8/41 (19.52%)
BitDefender    7.2    2010.07.10    Exploit.PPT.Gen
F-Secure    9.0.15370.0    2010.07.09    Exploit.PPT.Gen
GData    21    2010.07.10    Exploit.PPT.Gen
McAfee-GW-Edition    2010.1    2010.07.05    Heuristic.BehavesLike.Exploit.P97.CodeExec.PGPG
Norman    6.05.11    2010.07.10    ShellCode.D
nProtect    2010-07-10.01    2010.07.10    Exploit.PPT.Gen
Sophos    4.55.0    2010.07.10    Troj/ExpPPT-A
TrendMicro-HouseCall    9.120.0.1004    2010.07.10    HEUR_OLEXP.B
Additional information
File size: 838144 bytes
MD5...: a362abe459c574b1984640316219c818

Headers

Received: from SNT127-W1 ([65.55.90.136]) by snt0-omc3-s15.snt0.hotmail.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.4675);
     Thu, 8 Jul 2010 00:01:36 -0700
Message-ID:
Return-Path: jorge.vargas43@hotmail.com
Content-Type: multipart/mixed;
    boundary="_dafedb01-4726-4c6a-ab40-94312905e44c_"
X-Originating-IP: [69.64.56.19]
From: Jorge Vargas
To: xxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: China and the Cheonan Incident
Date: Thu, 8 Jul 2010 08:01:36 +0100
Importance: Normal
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-OriginalArrivalTime: 08 Jul 2010 07:01:36.0526 (UTC) FILETIME=[67FE8AE0:01CB1E6B]

Hostname: usloft1344.serverloft.com
ISP: Hosting Solutions International
Organization: INTERLAND
Proxy: Suspected network sharing device.
Country: United States  
State/Region: Georgia
City: Atlanta

Jul 8 CVE-2009-3129 XLS AIT Chairman Ray Burghardt Event Schedule


 Download   15a22ac5b7ed9fd640d6220dac0b4488 AIT Chairman Ray Burghardt Event Schedule.xls as a password protected archive (contact me if you need the password)


From: jennifer.tsao@gmail.com [mailto:jennifer.tsao@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 08, 2010 5:14 AM
To: XXXXXX
Subject: RE:AIT Chairman Ray Burghardt Event Schedule








Result: 14/42 (33.34%)
http://www.virustotal.com/analisis/3b283fedb486aa1cf6e2f0df630be8c383214a41f87464e2700ef07542b3c32b-1280207569
AntiVir    8.2.4.26    2010.07.26    EXP/Excel.CVE-2009-3129
Antiy-AVL    2.0.3.7    2010.07.26    Exploit/MSExcel.Agent
Authentium    5.2.0.5    2010.07.27    MSExcel/Dropper.B!Camelot
Avast    4.8.1351.0    2010.07.26    Win32:CVE-2009-3129
Avast5    5.0.332.0    2010.07.26    Win32:CVE-2009-3129
Emsisoft    5.0.0.34    2010.07.27    Exploit.Win32.CVE-2009!IK
GData    21    2010.07.27    Win32:CVE-2009-3129
Ikarus    T3.1.1.84.0    2010.07.27    Exploit.Win32.CVE-2009
Kaspersky    7.0.0.125    2010.07.27    Exploit.MSExcel.Agent.z
McAfee-GW-Edition    2010.1    2010.07.27    Heuristic.BehavesLike.Exploit.X97.CodeExec.PGPG
Microsoft    1.6004    2010.07.26    Exploit:Win32/CVE-2009-3129
Norman    6.05.11    2010.07.26    ShellCode.A
TrendMicro    9.120.0.1004    2010.07.27    TROJ_EXELDROP.C
TrendMicro-HouseCall    9.120.0.1004    2010.07.27    TROJ_EXELDROP.C
Additional information
File size: 114750 bytes
MD5...: 7d97fd70f28ded26ea2448669651e562

Wednesday, July 7, 2010

Jul 7 CVE-2010-0188 PDF Britain intelligence service started analysis of the spy radio

CVE-2010-0188 Unspecified vulnerability in Adobe Reader and Acrobat 8.x before 8.2.1 and 9.x before 9.3.1 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via unknown vectors

The message attachment name says "Britain intelligence service started analysis of the spy radio". Then the body says "internal info".
While it can lure in a few readers, I'd say it is a very inane attempt to get into the targeted attack business. In general, I have not seen any high quality (zero day-low detection) or well designed targeted messages that would be clearly originating in Russia (not to say they don't exist). If you did see any convincing targeted attacks that were or looked like they were from Russia and they are as good as these, please let me know. I have a few more editorial comments regarding espionage in general and targeted attacks in particular, but I should probably leave them out and let you have fun with the attachment. Let me know if you find anything extra interesting inside (M).


Download  bfa67a03fd7d88b9b7ebeb5cae3cd95aac as a password protected archive (please contact me for the password if you need it)




 -----Original Message-----
From: usadog@mail.ru [mailto:usadog@mail.ru]
Sent: Wednesday, July 07, 2010 5:56 AM
To: aa@minprom.gov.ru
Subject: Britan razvedka mi5 vstupila v rassledovanie racci shpiona

vnutr.infa.


 File Britan_razvedka_mi5_vstupila_v_ra  received on 2010.07.07 17:10:19 (UTC)
http://www.virustotal.com/analisis/d788e52e6999e1a162d04ebc9d211f1c1d6ca41636a97709b058d44ba2f70829-1278522619
Result: 15/41 (36.59%)
AntiVir     8.2.4.10     2010.07.07     EXP/Pidief.529300
Authentium     5.2.0.5     2010.07.07     JS/Pdfka.AD
Avast     4.8.1351.0     2010.07.07     PDF:CVE-2010-0188
Avast5     5.0.332.0     2010.07.07     PDF:CVE-2010-0188
BitDefender     7.2     2010.07.07     Exploit.TIFF.Gen
eTrust-Vet     36.1.7690     2010.07.07     PDF/Pidief.RV
F-Prot     4.6.1.107     2010.07.07     JS/Pdfka.AD
F-Secure     9.0.15370.0     2010.07.07     Exploit.TIFF.Gen
McAfee     5.400.0.1158     2010.07.07     Exploit-PDF.q.gen!stream
McAfee-GW-Edition     2010.1     2010.07.05     Heuristic.BehavesLike.PDF.Suspicious.O
PCTools     7.0.3.5     2010.07.07     Trojan.Pidief
Sophos     4.54.0     2010.07.07     Troj/PDFJs-II
Symantec     20101.1.0.89     2010.07.07     Trojan.Pidief.I
VirusBuster     5.0.27.0     2010.07.06     Exploit.JS.Pdfka.T
Additional information
File size: 531530 bytes
MD5   : bfa67a03fd7d88b9b7ebeb5cae3cd95a

Tuesday, July 6, 2010

Jul 6 CVE-2010-1297 PDF EPA's Water Sampling Report from spoofed OCSPP@epa.gov


Download  719cf2bab291da52e495b86929b7ea7d  and 0733c4e2122cdfcfdd4699a3cbdc8b40  as a password protected archive (contact me if you need the password)



From: Office of Chemical Safety and Pollution Prevention, EPA [mailto:OCSPP@epa.gov]
Sent: Tuesday, July 06, 2010 5:31 AM
To: XXXXXXXXXXXXX
Subject: EPA's Water Sampling Report
Importance: High

EPA surface water samples collected June 17 - 26, 2010 along the Gulf Coast did not reveal elevated levels of chemicals found in oil.

Surface water results collected May 21 through June 24, 2010 along the coast of Louisiana were measured for two of the chemicals associated with dispersants (2-Butoxyethanol and 2-Ethylhexyl Alcohol).
Why is EPA sampling and monitoring the water?

EPA’s water sampling process includes the collection of the sample, laboratory analyses and data verification (which ensures high quality data). These steps take about 7 days to complete before the data can be posted on EPA’s website. As such, the data EPA posts is not representative of current conditions but rather is a snapshot in time for a given location. We continue to take water samples and will post data as soon as it becomes available.
My water tastes or smells different.  What should I do?

You can contact the Joint Information Center, or JIC, located in the heart of the response effort. The JIC is a coordination center for federal, state and local responding agencies. You may call the JIC at 985-902-5231.


 File water_update_part2.pdf received on 2010.07.07 11:39:21 (UTC)
http://www.virustotal.com/analisis/8f60aa88853eec6e0ffce6ea2a8916a597ff105b6e4a087454b2a9bfa82ef4c8-1278502761
Result: 14/41 (34.15%)
AntiVir    8.2.4.10    2010.07.07    EXP/CVE-2010-1297
Antiy-AVL    2.0.3.7    2010.07.07    Exploit/SWF.CVE-2010-1297
Avast    4.8.1351.0    2010.07.06    JS:Pdfka-AIX
Avast5    5.0.332.0    2010.07.06    JS:Pdfka-AIX

eTrust-Vet    36.1.7690    2010.07.07    SWF/CVE-2010-1297.A!exploit
F-Secure    9.0.15370.0    2010.07.07    Exploit.PDF-Name.Gen
GData    21    2010.07.07    Exploit.PDF-Name.Gen
Kaspersky    7.0.0.125    2010.07.07    Exploit.SWF.CVE-2010-1297.a
McAfee-GW-Edition    2010.1    2010.07.05    Heuristic.BehavesLike.PDF.Suspicious.O
nProtect    2010-07-07.01    2010.07.07    Exploit.PDF-Name.Gen
PCTools    7.0.3.5    2010.07.07    Trojan.Pidief
Sophos    4.54.0    2010.07.07    Mal/PDFEx-D
Symantec    20101.1.0.89    2010.07.07    Trojan.Pidief.J
Additional information
File size: 427577 bytes
MD5...: 719cf2bab291da52e495b86929b7ea7d

 File water_update_part1.pdf received on 2010.07.06 12:56:30 (UTC)
http://www.virustotal.com/analisis/1cffccaf528a882f781fb179a32356bfb176d683059c89faf81d7a51687330e0-1278420990
Result: 14/41 (34.15%)
AntiVir     8.2.4.2     2010.07.06     EXP/CVE-2010-1297
Antiy-AVL     2.0.3.7     2010.07.06     Exploit/SWF.CVE-2010-1297
Avast     4.8.1351.0     2010.07.06     JS:Pdfka-AIX
Avast5     5.0.332.0     2010.07.06     JS:Pdfka-AIX
BitDefender     7.2     2010.07.06     Exploit.PDF-Name.Gen
eTrust-Vet     36.1.7688     2010.07.06     SWF/CVE-2010-1297.A!exploit
F-Secure     9.0.15370.0     2010.07.06     Exploit.PDF-Name.Gen
GData     21     2010.07.06     Exploit.PDF-Name.Gen
Kaspersky     7.0.0.125     2010.07.06     Exploit.SWF.CVE-2010-1297.a
McAfee-GW-Edition     2010.1     2010.07.05     Heuristic.BehavesLike.PDF.Suspicious.O
nProtect     2010-07-06.01     2010.07.06     Exploit.PDF-Name.Gen
PCTools     7.0.3.5     2010.07.06     Trojan.Pidief
Sophos     4.54.0     2010.07.06     Mal/PDFEx-D
Symantec     20101.1.0.89     2010.07.06     Trojan.Pidief.J
Additional information
File size: 531280 bytes
MD5   : 0733c4e2122cdfcfdd4699a3cbdc8b40


Headers
Received: from pacificteaze.com (HELO ESMTP) (68.122.214.114)
  by XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Received: from SRV001([10.1.0.25]) by SMTPSRV (AIMC 2.9.5.7)with SMTP id tm393855644;
From: "Office of Chemical Safety and Pollution Prevention, EPA"
To: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Subject: EPA's Water Sampling Report
Sender: "Office of Chemical Safety and Pollution Prevention, EPA"
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="= Multipart Boundary 0706100230"
Date: Tue, 6 Jul 2010 02:30:59 -0700
X-Priority: 2
Priority: urgent
X-MSMail-Priority: High
Message-ID: <20100706093059109.2D45410B3A2B4742@server1>
X-Scanned: By Symantec Anti-Virus Scan Engine
X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 6.00.2800.1106
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2800.1106

68.122.214.114
Hostname:    pacificteaze.com
ISP:    SBC Internet Services
Organization:    Pacific Teaze
Proxy:    None detected
Type:    Broadband
Assignment:    Static IP
 Country:    United States
State/Region:    California
City:    Chatsworth

Jul 06 CVE-2009-3129 XLS Update Report 0702 from ycyeh@mail.moe.gov.tw


 Download   0702g.xls 9b60af61854a4334967377c0d19a4af4  as a password protected archive (contact me if you need the password)




From: ycyeh [mailto:ycyeh@mail.moe.gov.tw]
Sent: Tuesday, July 06, 2010 4:00 AM
To:XXXXXXXXXXXX
Subject: 更新0702週報表

From: ycyeh [mailto: ycyeh@mail.moe.gov.tw]Sent: Tuesday, July 06, 2010 4:00 AMTo: XXXXXXXXXXXXSubject: Update Report 0702 weeks
                                                                     
 File 0702g.xls received on 2010.07.27 05:33:32 (UTC)
http://www.virustotal.com/analisis/3000b45d24d2f958efbba838c27c5dc7e110b0ecd53aa772a46e7c2a0093263b-1280208812
Result: 14/41 (34.15%)
AntiVir    8.2.4.26    2010.07.26    EXP/Excel.CVE-2009-3129
Antiy-AVL    2.0.3.7    2010.07.26    Exploit/Win32.CVE-2009-3129
Authentium    5.2.0.5    2010.07.27    MSExcel/Dropper.B!Camelot
Avast    4.8.1351.0    2010.07.26    Win32:CVE-2009-3129
Avast5    5.0.332.0    2010.07.26    Win32:CVE-2009-3129
Emsisoft    5.0.0.34    2010.07.27    Exploit.Win32.CVE-2009!IK
GData    21    2010.07.27    Win32:CVE-2009-3129
Ikarus    T3.1.1.84.0    2010.07.27    Exploit.Win32.CVE-2009
Kaspersky    7.0.0.125    2010.07.27    Exploit.Win32.CVE-2009-3129.a
McAfee    5.400.0.1158    2010.07.27    Exploit-MSExcel.u
McAfee-GW-Edition    2010.1    2010.07.27    Heuristic.BehavesLike.Exploit.X97.CodeExec.PGPG
Microsoft    1.6004    2010.07.26    Exploit:Win32/CVE-2009-3129
Norman    6.05.11    2010.07.26    ShellCode.A
TrendMicro-HouseCall    9.120.0.1004    2010.07.27    HEUR_OLEXP.B
Additional information
File size: 104510 bytes
MD5...: 9b60af61854a4334967377c0d19a4af4

Headers
Received: from IBM-62979760B13 ([211.75.147.173])
    by msr25.hinet.net (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id PAA06994
Reply-To: ycyeh@mail.moe.gov.tw
From: "ycyeh"
To: "=?BIG5?B?tsCktqW/?="
Subject: =?BIG5?B?p/O3czA3MDK2Z7P4qu0=?=
Date: Tue, 6 Jul 2010 16:00:00 +0800

Hostname:    mx3.imedia.com.tw
ISP:    CHTD, Chunghwa Telecom Co., Ltd.
Organization:    Ming Siang Printing Co., Ltd.
Proxy:    None detected
Type:    Broadband
Assignment:    Static IP
Country:    Taiwan tw flag
State/Region:    T'ai-pei
City:    Taipei


Thursday, July 1, 2010

July 01 CVE-2009-4324 PDF draft document from ly203972@gmail.com


Download d3c23ff3f116f0f80cb8d3e0e1496d93 ATT58351.pdf  as a password protected archive (contact me if you need the password)
From: 楊千惠 [mailto:ly203972@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 01, 2010 10:57 PM
Subject: 輸入文件初稿,請參考!

提供輸入文件議題之粗淺資料,請大家參考指教。加油! 

From: Yang Qianhui [mailto: ly203972@gmail.com]Sent: Thursday, July 01, 2010 10:57 PM
Subject: draft document..
 
Issue of providing superficial information on the input file, please refer to teach. Come on!


 File ATT58351.pdf received on 2010.07.04 03:26:21 (UTC)
http://www.virustotal.com/analisis/310f2caa515f58c48b355a3813b48512201d419495f8410e97c8c9e8512da0a1-1278213981
Result: 12/41 (29.27%)
Antivirus     Version     Last Update     Result
a-squared    5.0.0.31    2010.07.03    Exploit.JS.Pdfka!IK
AntiVir    8.2.4.2    2010.07.02    EXP/Pidief.244965
BitDefender    7.2    2010.07.04    Exploit.PDF-JS.Gen
CAT-QuickHeal    11.00    2010.06.30    Exploit.PDF.FlateDecode
DrWeb    5.0.2.03300    2010.07.04    Exploit.PDF.687
F-Prot    4.6.1.107    2010.07.03    JS/ShellCode.X.gen
F-Secure    9.0.15370.0    2010.07.03    Exploit.PDF-JS.Gen
GData    21    2010.07.04    Exploit.PDF-JS.Gen
Ikarus    T3.1.1.84.0    2010.07.03    Exploit.JS.Pdfka
McAfee-GW-Edition    2010.1    2010.07.02    Heuristic.BehavesLike.JS.BufferOverflow.A
Norman    6.05.10    2010.07.03    JS/Shellcode.FL
nProtect    2010-07-03.02    2010.07.03    Exploit.PDF-JS.Gen
Additional information
File size: 272098 bytes
MD5...: d3c23ff3f116f0f80cb8d3e0e1496d93 



Vicheck result
PDF Exploit call to media.newPlayer CVE-2009-4324 
https://www.vicheck.ca/malware.php?hash=d3c23ff3f116f0f80cb8d3e0e1496d93