End of the year presents:
Malicious Java file containing W32.Crisis and OSX.Crisis
Related News and Analysis:
Aug 2012
Crisis for Windows Sneaks onto Virtual Machines - Symantec
New Apple Mac Trojan Called OSX/Crisis Discovered - Intego
Here is quick post for a CVE-2012-5076 sample (from Cool pack, as described by Kafeine here Cool EK : "Hello my friend..." CVE-2012-5076 )
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| img.kids.discovery.com |
Download Phoenix2.zip as a password protected archive (contact me if you need the password)| Filename | MD5 | File Size | Extension | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| flash.swf | C643C2B8E901E52C14A8D6CE8096E327 | 1,645 | swf | |
| all.pdf | 66BDB0DC68294890E359E91F1EF18D9E | 2,677 | ||
| allv7.pdf | B948321DE93582951598F3BDDDCC5735 | 2,465 | ||
| collab.pdf | EF68F7B0018EDA2C149EF92EAAA666E2 | 2,012 | CVE-2007-5659 | |
| geticon.pdf | 1ED11F0EEE47135067F36E73FD5E889E | 2,003 | CVE-2009-0927 | |
| libtiff.pdf | E1E581CC0D817A808DC33CEB230F91B4 | 3,514 | CVE-2010-0188 | |
| newplayer.pdf | 37F28E5BE542AD2E32DA19EE5C44967C | 1,975 | CVE-2009-4324 | |
| printf.pdf | AF680ECCA07B3294553F672F78554588 | 1,907 | CVE-2008-2992 | |
| index.js | B07E39D831F8EA3F8BCD84DCC9A60FFF | 14,272 | js | |
| des.jar | 98F5ACDB21E8B8116FE5C7B4BA17D0E9 | 8,539 | jar | |
| ie.html | 30C1A7B87C419A1427932773642FEEE7 | 14,929 | CVE-2009-3867 | html |
| index.html | 9939596B9BA5ECD4EE5FD648171EF01C | 14,462 | html | |
| vistaie7.html | E8888E4EDA75F6CE016A5FBA9BE02FA3 | 14,415 | html | |
| vistan7ie8.html | 6D11908E6CCC01B14ED0097561853F86 | 8,747 | html | |
| vistan7other.html | 3E4B94ED2A6ED5F7FF42165BB165A46B | 13,734 | html | |
| xpie7.html | EDE58120D8C76212E458898B348D2B80 | 14,420 | html | |
| xpie8.html | A18CCEEE89E13B137C77F88688668CED | 8,714 | html | |
| xpother.html | 355A809F8B5BDE1E511C628DD75CD871 | 14,129 | html |
object and embed for different browsers. Read this article for more details http://borodin.livejournal.com/10471.html
Download 95f3ec9b3bb5e1792fd604eb6a0b5af0 gsb50 as a password protected archive (contact me if you need the password)----------------------------------------
Tuesday, April 13, 2010
Donato "ratsoul" Ferrante
Hello,
some days ago Param (thanks!) one of our blog readers sent me a couple of undetected JAVA malwares, which I'm going to analyze, the md5 are:
(Sample 1) 2138bfc0c92b726a13ff5095bd2f2b72
(Sample 2) a0585edf638f5d1c556239d3bfaf08db
At this time, both of this malware have a low detection, the first one 1/42 and the second one 0/42 from VirusTotal.
One of the interesting things is that if you try to decompile these samples by using jD you will get the following notice:So after a little investigation I figured out the reason. The reason is that jD is unable to handle methods with a large body.
Is it a problem ? No. To proceed with the analysis we can summon JAD. In fact by using JAD we can obtain the full code. Here are some snippets taken from the two samples.
(I will go fast on the analysis, at the end of the post you can find a couple of links with more details about these malwares.)
Sample 1:
([CVE-2009-3867])
Imports reveal a lot of information about what the malware is trying to "use"...
Wednesday, March 17, 2010Donato "ratsoul" FerranteWednesday, March 17, 2010
JAVA Malware Family
Hello guys,
do you remember one of my last post about a JAVA malware exploiting a vulnerability related to the deserialization? If not, you can read it here.
In the last days I have found a lot of variants of this malware. I picked for this post the following:
sample 1: 3af7627af6348a76d1bf3b7bf31514e0
sample 2: a022524cb52223a939ba50043d90ff94
sample 3: d45a156c76f3c34bac0cf22cb586fdd1
In this post we will try to discover a quick way to detect this "family" of malware.
Each jar comes with 3 classes as for the original sample that I analyzed. The class names are changed into AdgredY, DyesyasZ, LoaderX, for one of these samples.
First thing to note is about the class names. We can note the following relations:
C1. AppletX is AdgredY;
C2. PayloadX is DyesyasZ;
C3. LoaderX is LoaderX.
The class name length is the same as the original one, also the position of the capital letters is preserved.
Let's proceed.
Here is some snippet of code taken from the Applet subclass of each sample above.Sample 1.
Sunday, March 7, 2010Donato "ratsoul" FerranteJAVA Sound Malware
Hello guys,
I'm sorry for the few posts in the last weeks, but I was quite busy. Today I am going to analyze another interesting JAVA malware.
Our target is a jar, md5: 38f083169319d0141532db992d295448. The jar contains one class: AppletX. After using a java decompiler on our target, we will get the AppletX class code.
I will report only the relevant parts. Let's go..Firstly, the malware tries to discover the operating system in use by using System.getProperty("os.name"), then it fills str1 according to the O.S. in use.At this point the malware proceeds by exploiting a vulnerability located into getSoundBank method [CVE-2009-3867] to execute malicious code on the victim system. It retrieves the parameters: sc and np (meaningful names) and then it uses the following spray method in order to place the shellcode:As we can see, this function simply converts the parameters into hex and then it calls the real spray method:
Sunday, January 17, 2010Donato "ratsoul" Ferrante
JAVA Mobile Malware #1
Hi guys,
today I will focus on a JAVA mobile malware (md5 is: 7e92d280472ca426aff1c20fbeb8d2db).
It is spread as jar, containing a class with an attractive name. The jar contains three files:
* a java class (the malware engine);
* an icon image (it is used in order to be attractive..);
* an inf file (it is used to extract sms information).
The following is the class code after the usage of jd. I report only relevant parts:
LoadData:This method is used to read the inf file in order to fill smsnumber and smstext fields. It uses the first byte of the inf file to know how many sms should be sent.
InputStreamString:This method is used to read user-defined strings from the inf file.